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UNEXPECTED INEQUALITY: DISPARATE-IMPACT FROM 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE DECISIONS 
 
Sahar Takshi, J.D. 
Systemic discrimination in healthcare plagues marginalized groups. 
Physicians incorrectly view people of color as having high pain tolerance, leading 
to undertreatment. Women with disabilities are often undiagnosed because their 
symptoms are dismissed. Low-income patients have less access to appropriate 
treatment. These patterns, and others, reflect long-standing disparities that have 
become engrained in U.S. health systems.  
As the healthcare industry adopts artificial intelligence and algorithm-
informed (AI) tools, it is vital that regulators address healthcare discrimination. AI 
tools are increasingly used to make both clinical and administrative decisions by 
hospitals, physicians, and insurers—yet there is no framework that specifically 
places nondiscrimination obligations on AI users. The Food & Drug 
Administration has limited authority to regulate AI and has not sought to 
incorporate anti-discrimination principles in its guidance. Section 1557 of the 
Affordable Care Act has not been used to enforce nondiscrimination in healthcare 
AI and is under-utilized by the Office of Civil Rights. State level protections by 
medical licensing boards or malpractice liability are similarly untested and have 
not yet extended nondiscrimination obligations to AI.  
This Article discusses the role of each legal obligation on healthcare AI and 
the ways in which each system can improve to address discrimination. It highlights 
the ways in which industries can self-regulate to set nondiscrimination standards 
and concludes by recommending standards and creating a super-regulator to 
address disparate impact by AI. As the world moves towards automation, it is 
imperative that ongoing concerns about systemic discrimination are removed to 
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A 2019 study revealed that an algorithm used by UnitedHealth, one of the 
nation’s largest managed care organizations, might be violating state and federal 
law: The algorithm had a racially discriminatory impact.1 The algorithm (called 
“Impact Pro”) makes eligibility determinations for “high risk care management” 
services by identifying patients with complex health needs.2 The researchers found 
that it deemed black patients’ health needs as “less than” white patients’, and as a 
result, black patients were not targeted to benefit from specialized care management 
programs.3 Such discriminatory effects from artificial intelligence and augmented 
intelligence (AI) are not undocumented;4 however, the study was the first to expose 
these effects from automation in the healthcare industry. One can imagine an AI 
system that relies on a patient’s oral description of their symptoms to design a 
treatment plan, or automated imaging technology that diagnoses skin conditions—
both systems have the potential to discriminate against patients because it has been 
proven that AI systems have greater difficulty understanding African American 
vernacular and analyzing images of people of color.5 
Discrimination in the healthcare industry is not a novel concept. Thirty-five 
years ago, then-Secretary Margaret Heckler issued a report and recommendations 
based on the findings from the Task Force on Black and Minority health, with the 
report’s focal point being minority groups experiencing tremendous amounts of 
“excess deaths” compared to their non-minority counterparts.6 Despite the Heckler 
 
1 Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of 






3 Id.; Isabel F. Farhi, NY Action Against UnitedHealth Algorithm, CONSUMER L. ROUND-UP (Nov. 
12, 2019), https://consumer.jenner.com/2019/11/ny-action-against-unitedhealth-algorithm.html. 
 
4 Tom C.V. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 531 (2019) 
(financial industry); Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395 (2018) 
(employment); Karen Hao, AI is sending people to jail—and getting it wrong, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612775/algorithms-criminal-justice-ai/ 
(criminal justice system). 
 
5 See generally Cade Metz, There Is a Racial Divide in Speech-Recognition Systems, Researchers 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/speech-
recognition-bias-apple-amazon-google.html (reporting that even the best performing AI system 
misunderstood 27% of words spoken by Blacks); Larry Hardesty, Study finds gender and skin-type 




6 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S TASK FORCE ON BLACK 





Report’s call to action—increased education and information, professional 
development, and research and data gathering—health disparities have persisted. 
Racial and ethnic minorities continue to experience higher rates of premature death 
and chronic disease. Native Americans and Alaskan natives have higher rates of 
infant mortality, and black patients are more likely to be inaccurately deemed as 
having high pain tolerance.7  From a healthcare entity’s perspective, healthcare AI 
presents a significant compliance challenge issue because of the risk of 
discrimination and relevant regulations (or lack thereof). 
The introduction of AI-informed decision making into the healthcare sphere 
will continue to exacerbate many of these inequities, and possibly introduce new 
ones (e.g., in diagnosis and treatment decisions). The promise of AI as a more 
consistent, and even more accurate, decisionmaker means automation is likely to 
become the standard in healthcare, but should these positives outweigh its 
discriminatory impact? This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, this Article 
will outline the current and prospective uses of AI in healthcare and provide 
examples of potential discriminatory effects. Part II discusses the Food & Drug 
Administration’s current efforts to regulate AI used in medical settings, particularly 
as clinical decision supports. This Part also highlights the gaps in regulations and 
makes recommendations to bolster the agency’s role in fighting healthcare 
discrimination. Part III will introduce Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act and 
argue that this nondiscrimination provision alone is inadequate to prevent or 
remedy disparate-impact from AI-informed decisions by providers and insurers 
beginning by describing the Department of Health and Human Service’s 
enforcement of Section 1557, and further making recommendations for covered 
entities as they develop their compliance programs to address AI based on these 
enforcement actions. It then discusses the limited possibility of private rights of 
action for plaintiffs who are disparately impacted by healthcare AI. Part IV 
describes the novel compliance challenges posed by licensing laws and malpractice 
liability doctrines in relation to healthcare AI.  Finally, Part V introduces 
recommendations for the healthcare industry to develop internal compliance 




7 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., COMMUNITIES IN ACTION: PATHWAYS TO HEALTH 
EQUITY (James N. Weinstein et al. eds., 2017); Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial bias in pain 
assessment and treatment recommendations, and false beliefs about biological differences 
between blacks and whites, 113 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 4296, 4300 
(2016), https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/16/4296.full.pdf. The 2020 COVID-19 outbreak 
has exposed yet another pitfall in health equity in the United States, with many low-income 
individuals being unable to access treatment due to lack of insurance coverage and inability to 
practice social-distancing as a precautionary measure due to hourly employment without paid sick 
leave. See also Royce Dunmore, How Coronavirus Affects Black People: Civil Rights Groups Call 







II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTHCARE 
A. How is Artificial Intelligence Used in the Healthcare Industry? 
AI refers to a broad subset of computer sciences where machines are 
capable of making decisions that are typically made by humans.8 Other industries 
use AI for decisions such as public-benefits eligibility determinations, risk–threat 
analysis, and employment recruitment efforts. In the healthcare industry, AI is 
increasingly being used for both administrative decisions and clinical decisions. 
Some examples include: 
● Administrative decisions (e.g., making appointments, billing, 
reimbursement requests); 
● Custodial (e.g., driverless vehicles to pull laundry, food services, clean 
rooms, automated pharmacy, cross-check travel conditions);  
● Medical applications and wearables;  
● Caregiving (“robotic” cribs, voice companions, electric lifts);  
● Research and education;  
● Clinical data analytics;  
● Imaging, pathology, and radiology (e.g., detecting cancers, stroke, 
pneumonia, analyzing x-rays and scans);  
● Predictive diagnosis (i.e., clinical decision supports); and  
● Procedural AI (e.g., “tiny robots injected into the body for targeted drug 
delivery as an alternative to surgery”).9  
 
AI is increasingly being used to make clinical determinations, such as to 
diagnose skin cancer10 or recommend a combination of chemotherapy for cancer 
patients.11 It can be used to determine individual patients’ risk of deteriorating, 
which allows physicians to predict which patients are likely to need to be 
transferred to the intensive care unit and intervene before a clinical emergency, 
increasing the rate of survival.12 Tools like reSET-O (created by Pear Therapeutics) 
 
8 Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA passes first policy recommendation on augmented 
intelligence (June 14, 2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-passes-
first-policy-recommendations-augmented-intelligence (The American Medical Association’s 2018 
policy recommendation prefers the term “augmented intelligence.”). 
 
9 Nicolas Terry, Of Regulating Healthcare AI and Robots, 21 YALE J. L. & TECH. 133, 144–47 
(2019). 
 
10 Adewole S. Adamson & Avery Smith, Machine Learning and Health Care Disparities in 
Dermatology, 154 JAMA DERMATOLOGY 1247 (2018). 
 
11 See Robert Pearl, Artificial Intelligence In Healthcare: Separating Reality From Hype, FORBES 
(Mar. 13, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2018/03/13/artificial-
intelligence-in-healthcare/#7970d46b1d75. 
 





treats opioid-use disorders with cognitive behavioral therapy through a mobile 
application.13 Digital therapeutics created by Akili Interactive Labs work to treat or 
improvement cognitive impairments, such as ADHD, major depressive disorder, 
autism spectrum disorders, and multiple sclerosis through interactive digital 
therapies—similar to videogames.14 Before proceeding, it is important to clarify 
that currently even when AI is used in healthcare for clinical purposes, “the 
physician, not the AI, has primacy.”15 
Similarly, AI can be used to make administrative decisions outside of the 
examination or operating room. Managed care organizations use AI to prioritize 
risks in patients, allocate resources effectively, and allow physicians to intervene in 
patient care before health (and costs) skyrocket in critical situations.16 AI can be 
used to automate medical billing—a task that is tedious, time consuming, and prone 
to errors when done manually.17 AI also has the potential to further help providers 
make better clinical decisions—for example by informing physicians whether a 
patient is adhering to his or her therapy, and their response to that therapy.18 
The risks of disparate-impact on suspect classes arising from AI-informed 
decision making should be of concern to healthcare providers, hospitals and clinics, 
and insurers. As these entities update their compliance and ethics programs to 
include factors such as privacy and fraud and abuse violations related to healthcare 
AI, they should also include nondiscrimination principles. Just like AI, an effective 
compliance program is a dynamic and constantly evolving system. The remainder 
of this Article will include discussions on how healthcare entities can incorporate 
nondiscrimination standards into their written policies and procedures, compliance 
auditing and investigation, training and education, and remediation procedures. 
 
13 Press Release, Pear Therapeutics, Sandoz Inc. and Pear Therapeutics Obtain FDA Clearance for 
reSET-OTM to Treat Opioid Use Disorder (Dec. 10, 2018), https://peartherapeutics.com/sandoz-
inc-and-pear-therapeutics-obtain-fda-clearance-for-reset-o-to-treat-opioid-use-disorder/. 
 
14 Getting to the root of cognitive impairment, AKILI INTERACTIVE LABS, 
https://www.akiliinteractive.com/science-and-technology (last visited Mar. 11, 2020). 
 
15 Terry, supra note 9, at 137. 
 
16 Paul Nicolaus, How Will AI Factor into the Future of Managed Care Markets, 16 FIRST REPORT 
MANAGED CARE (Feb. 2019), https://www.managedhealthcareconnect.com/articles/how-will-ai-
factor-future-managed-care-markets; Rachael Zimlich, Real-World Applications of Artificial 
Intelligence in Healthcare, MANAGED CARE EXECUTIVE (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com/article/real-world-applications-artificial-
intelligence-healthcare (“[C]ertain artificial intelligence tools that interact with patients may also 
allow us to measure adherence and pill-taking behavior in real-time so we can identify changes in 
behavior immediately instead of after-the-fact.”). 
 
17 John Bailey, Artificial Intelligence & Healthcare: Rethinking Medical Billing, CHETU, 
https://www.chetu.com/blogs/healthcare/ai-and-healthcare-medical-billing.php (last visited Mar. 
16, 2020). 
 





B. UnitedHealth as a Cautionary Tale: Biases in AI and Resulting 
Discrimination 
A recent study found that an algorithm used by U.S. health systems 
(UnitedHealth Group) has been discriminating against black patients. This 
algorithm, created by Optum, was used to identify the most high-risk patients to 
inform allocation of funds in the healthcare system. The algorithm used health care 
costs to make its predictions; however, spending for black patients is lower than for 
white patients due to “unequal access to care.”19 These historic racial disparities in 
access to care translated into a racial bias in the algorithm—as a result, only 17.7% 
of black patients were identified as high-risk, but the study estimates that the true 
number should have been 46.5%.20 In a letter to UnitedHealth, New York officials 
stated: “By relying on historic spending to triage and diagnose current patients, 
your algorithm appears to inherently prioritize white patients who have had greater 
access to healthcare than black patients.”21 The racial bias in Optum’s algorithm 
not only presents a discrimination problem (in the form of disparate-impact), but 
can also harm individual patients in that it hinders physicians from not intervening 
in advance of a medical crisis.  
Discrimination as a result of biases in AI is well-documented in other 
fields,22 but the UnitedHealth case study is the only publicly available evidence of 
such effects in the health care context.23  Scholars suspect that the discriminatory 
 
19 Obermeyer et al., supra note 1, at 447–48  (noting that while healthcare costs and medical needs 
are generally correlated (“sicker patients need and receive more care, on average”), deviations 
arise from health disparities: lack of healthcare insurance, resulting from geography, 
transportation, and job demands, and “taste-based” discrimination (e.g., white physicians not 
recommending preventative care to black patients). 
 
20 Id. at 449. 
 
21 Letter from Linda Lacewell, Superintendent, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., and Howard A. 
Zucker, Comm’r, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, to David S. Wichmann, CEO, UnitedHealth Group 
Inc. (Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/20191025160637.pdf (responding to the 
Obermeyer study and stating that UnitedHealth may not “produce, rely on, or promote an 
algorithm that has a discriminatory effect.”) [hereinafter NY Letter to UnitedHealth]. 
 
22 See Soniya Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 54, 71 (2019) (LGBTQ+ individuals in targeted ads); McKenzie Raub, Bots, Bias and Big 
Data: Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Bias and Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring Practices, 
71 ARK. L. REV. 529, 540–43 (2018) (women and racial minorities in hiring algorithms); Kristilian 





zwfXRgYNqUDbybnAVsHSC6KhR9WXrKYTMY%3D (racial bias in predictive policing). 
 
23 States, however, are aware of this effect. See, e.g., NY Letter to UnitedHealth, supra note 21, at 




effects of AI will seep into the healthcare realm as well.24 A major barrier to 
analyzing the frequency and magnitude of discrimination and physical harm 
resulting from AI is the proprietary nature of the algorithms.25 Without more 
research, it is impossible to estimate the extent of biases in healthcare AIs outside 
of UnitedHealth; however, research from other industries is a good place to start.  
The human-like decision making capacity of AI is developed by first 
introducing a training data-set—i.e., historical data that the AI uses to detect 
patterns and make future predictions.26 One way that bias can enter into an AI 
system is unintentional lack of diversity in the training dataset. For example, visual 
AI tools have been shown to display racial and gender disparities: A facial 
recognition AI software was unable to accurately identify over one-third of black 
women in a photo lineup (notably, the algorithm was trained on a majority male 
and white dataset).27 Voice-recognition systems show similar “race gaps,” tools 
created by companies such as Microsoft and Apple are unable to understand speech 
by black people.28 The UnitedHealth case-study reflects how such invisible biases 
in training data can disparately impact certain groups; not only might some patients 
be excluded from special programs or preventative-measures, but physicians might 
fail to diagnose certain patients who have been under-diagnosed historically. The 
same problem is likely to arise when AI is trained not just on historical data, but on 
data from research. The fact that women and minorities are frequently excluded 
from medical research means that any AI based on such research may not be fully 
representative of healthcare consumers.29 
 
disparities in mortality rates by creating the Maternal Review Board and making recommendations 
to the Department of Health). 
 
24 See Sharona Hoffman, What Genetic Testing Teaches About Predictive Health Analytics, 98 
N.C. L. REV. 123 (2019) (suggesting that AI in genetic testing may erroneously conclude that  
some women are at a higher risk for various health problems and disproportionately identify 
patients with criminal records as being high risk). 
 
25 See Obermeyer et al., supra note 1, at 447. 
 
26 The potential biases discussed in this section are not only errors in the original dataset, they 
continue to amplify at every stage of the AI’s decision-making process. See Katyal, supra note 22, 
at 67–68 (“Errors at any stage can become amplified in the next stage, producing deviant 
outcomes in complex, troubling and sometimes difficult-to-detect ways.”). 
 
27 Hardesty, supra note 5. In fact, many of the AI systems that have been cleared by the Food & 
Drug Administration have been visual or scanning AI tools—e.g., Contact (identifies symptoms of 
stroke), IDx-DR (identifies diabetic retinopathy), and Accipio (identifies intracranial hemorrhage). 
See David Muoio, Roundup: 12 healthcare algorithms cleared by the FDA, MOBILE HEALTH 
NEWS (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/roundup-12-healthcare-
algorithms-cleared-fda. 
 
28 Metz, supra note 5 (“This indicates that the problem lies in the way the systems are trained to 
recognize sound.”). 
 





In the criminal-justice system, AI is used to determine the likelihood of 
crime in certain neighborhoods and the predictions are then used by police stations 
to intervene in crimes. Unsurprisingly, this use of AI can lead to confirmation bias 
that perpetuates racial disparities—police continue to target communities of color 
for drug use because the algorithm seems to be correct (despite the fact that drug 
use is equal across races).30 The algorithm does not determine where crime is 
actually likely to occur, but rather where police is likely to detect the crime based 
on where they have detected them previously. These engrained stereotypes and the 
related confirmation bias can lead to similar challenges in the healthcare system—
for example, an AI system might assume that low-income patients are less likely to 
adhere to their treatment plans, leading physicians not to focus on those patients.31 
Similarly, it could lead to overdiagnosis of conditions among certain populations,32 
which may also result in inequitable insurance rates.33 
Depending on the use, the developers may intentionally exclude outlier data 
when they create AI. For example, Google may exclude or minimize a “minority 
interpretation of a search term” in its search results algorithm because it would not 
“help Google show relevant ads, generate clicks or produce revenue on a mass 
scale.”34 One could easily imagine a healthcare system excluding an outlier patient, 
for example with a rare disability or underrepresented ethnic group, from its AI 
tool. What effect would this have when a future patient with those characteristics 
enters the hospital system? If the AI is a clinical tool, would it lead to a misdiagnosis 
because the AI could not detect the rare disease? If the AI is an administrative tool, 
would it lead to fewer resources being allocated to that patient because the AI 
underestimated the costliness of treating that patient?35  
 
 
30 See Lum & Isaac, supra note 22, at 5. 
 
31 Alternatively, given the recent shift towards value-based care, physicians might instead focus 
more on those patients. This dichotomy reflects a key challenge with AI in healthcare: Does the 
responsibility for and liability from decision-making lie with the AI or with the provider? This 
issue will be explored more in Part IV.B (Malpractice Liability). 
 
32 Effy Vayena, Machine learning in medicine: Addressing ethical challenge, 15 PLOS MED. 
(2018), https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002689 (“[I]n 
population data biased by the entrenched overdiagnosis of schizophrenia in African Americans.”). 
 
33 See Katyal, supra note 22, at 96 (noting that health insurers can charge higher premiums based 
on irrelevant characteristics). 
 
34 Id. at 69–70. 
 
35 Another form of discrimination can arise not from the AI making decisions, but the information 
that the AI collects which is later shared with other entities. Healthcare data in particular is very 
valuable. See CHRIS WAYMAN & NATASHA HUNERIACH, REALISING THE VALUE OF HEALTH CARE 
DATA: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE 2 (2019), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-
com/en_gl/topics/life-sciences/life-sciences-pdfs/ey-value-of-health-care-data-v20-final.pdf 
(noting that the 55 million patient records held by the UK’s National Health Service are valued at 
£5 billion, or just over $6 billion USD). Providers and insurers have an incentive to sell the non-




The possible biases described in this section reflect more than just errors in 
an algorithm, they indicate the potential for real harm to patients—such as physical 
harm (in the form of failed, delayed, or misdiagnosis, and inappropriate treatment) 
and social harm (in the form of inequitable billing, insurance rates, and coverage, 
and perpetuating stereotypes based on over-diagnosis). An analogy from Quartz 
magazine is apt: “Algorithms are like drugs,” they affect lives (i.e., have significant 
impact on the people/patients), perform differently on different demographics (i.e., 
algorithmic bias), and can have side effects (i.e., intended or unintended effects as 
a result of bias).36 Unlike prescription drugs, however, healthcare AI is largely 
unregulated, meaning healthcare entities have few legal obligations to comply with 
(especially in terms of disparate-impact analysis) and patients have little legal 
recourse. 
III. AGENCY OVERSIGHT OF HEALTHCARE AI 
A. Food & Drug Administration’s Current Approach to AI 
Despite the increased use of healthcare AI, there is little regulation of the 
emerging technology. Federal agencies, state medical boards, and trade 
organizations have only just begun to address the fate of this new technology. The 
Food & Drug Administration (FDA) has authority to regulate a medical device, 
which is “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in 
vitro reagent, or other similar related article” recognized as a pharmaceutical, used 
for diagnosis or treatment, or intended to affect the structure or function of the 
body.37 The 21st Century Cures Act, significantly limited the FDA’s ability to 
regulate AI; devices that support or provide recommendations to a healthcare 
professional, and the healthcare professional has the opportunity to “independently 
review the basis for such recommendation” are excluded from the definition of 
device.38 Notably, the FDA does not have the statutory authority to regulate devices 
 
biases that exist in that data can result in discrimination in whatever context the sold data is used 
(regardless of whether it resulted in discrimination in the AI’s original purpose). For example, an 
algorithm that over-estimated patients’ propensity for a certain illness at a community hospital, if 
sold, may result in life-insurance carriers charging higher premiums for people from that 
community. Although this paper will not discuss this in depth, the GDPR model used in European 
nations could protect against this form of second-degree discrimination. See Katyal, supra note 22, 
at 106–07 (noting that the GDPR model “requires individuals to have the right to confirm whether 
their personal data is being processed, the purpose of the process, the source of the data, and the 
logic behind any automated process”). 
 
36 Andy Coravos et al., We should treat algorithms like prescription drugs, QUARTZ (Feb. 14, 
2019), https://qz.com/1540594/treating-algorithms-like-prescription-drugs-could-reduce-ai-bias/. 
 
37 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2018). 
 
38 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-225, § 3060(a), 130 Stat. 1033 (codified as amended at 
21 U.S.C. § 520(o)(E)(ii)–(iii)). Specifically, the Act excludes devices that meet these criteria 
from the definition of medical device: (1) not intended to analyze medical images or signals from 




that are used as “administrative support[s],” such as billing and analyzing 
population level data.39 The FDA follows different processes to provide clearance 
or approval prior to marketing of a device based on its class;40 medical devices are 
reviewed under different standards (e.g., premarket clearance (510(k)), De Novo 
classification, or premarket approval) that highlight the risk to patients.41  
The agency’s regulatory framework, created in a pre-AI era, does not 
directly address AI technology, but the agency has developed guidance and a 
proposed a framework in the last two years. The FDA has previously regulated 
software as a medical device (SaMD)—i.e., “software intended to be used for one 
or more medical purposes that perform these purposes without being part of a 
hardware medical device.”42 Examples of SaMD include fertility apps that track 
reproductive outcomes and software that allows physicians and patients to view 
MRI results on smartphones.43 The FDA has issued guidance regulating SaMD, and 
a proposed regulatory framework for AI and machine-learning SaMDs.44 These 
 
used to display, analyze or print patient medical information (or information from clinical studies); 
(3) intended to support or give recommendations to healthcare professionals about preventing, 
diagnosing, or treating diseases; and (4) intended to be independently reviewed by a healthcare 
professional (as opposed to professional primarily relying on the recommendations). 
 
39 See Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(A) (providing in 
relevant part, “[t]he term device . . . shall not include a software function that is intended for 
administrative support of a health care facility, including the processing and maintenance of 
financial records, claims or billing information, appointment schedules, business analytics; 
information about patient populations, admissions, practice and inventory management, analysis 
of historical claims data to predict future utilization or cost-effectiveness, determination of health 
benefit eligibility, population health management, and laboratory workflow . . .). 
 
40 Floor Van Leeuwen, A 101 guide to the FDA-regulatory process for AI healthcare software 
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.quantib.com/blog/a-101-guide-to-the-fda-regulatory-process-for-ai-
radiology-software (explaining that class I and II are relatively low-patient risk products, whereas 
class III are products that sustain or support life, are implanted, or present a potential unreasonable 
risk of injury to the patient) [hereinafter FDA Regulatory Process for AI]. 
 
41 Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Software as a Medical Device, FDA.GOV, 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-
machine-learning-software-medical-device (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
 
42 Id. (explaining that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines medical purpose as those 
intended to treat, diagnose, mitigate, or prevent disease or other conditions). 
 
43 See Evan Heier, SaMD: Everything You Need to Know About Software as a Medical Device, 
SELECTHUB (Sept. 30 , 2019), https://www.selecthub.com/medical-software/software-medical-
device-samd/ (noting that software that “principally drive[s] a hardware device,” such as the 
software that enables the MRI to work, is not SaMD). 
 
44 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD): CLINICAL 
EVALUATION GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/100714/download [hereinafter SAMD GUIDANCE]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING [AI/ML]-BASED SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE [SAMD] 




documents focus on SaMD manufacturer’s responsibility to test for the validity of 
clinical associations (i.e., accuracy, reliability, and precision) and provide a detailed 
framework for evaluating for safety, effectiveness and performance; yet these 
documents do not provide robust guidance (or create obligations) for detecting and 
remedying discrimination.45   
In 2019, the FDA’s Digital Health program released the Digital Health 
Innovation Action Plan.46 The Plan recognized that  
FDA’s traditional approach . . . is not well suited for the faster 
iterative design, development, and type of validation used for 
software-based medical technologies. Traditional implementation 
of the premarket requirements may impede or delay patient access 
to critical evolutions of software technology, particularly those 
presenting a lower risk to patients.47 
Notably, the Digital Health Program developed policies and approaches to 
balance the benefits and risks to patients—one such approach was to not enforce 
compliance for “low risk” technologies so that they are readily available to 
consumers.48 This begs the question: Did the FDA consider disparate-impact on 
vulnerable populations in making such risk assessments? Most importantly, the 
FDA stated its intent to develop a pre-certification program that “could replace the 
need for a premarket submission for certain products and allow for decreased 
submission content and/or faster review of the marketing submission for other 
products.”49 The pre-cert program would regulate the developer rather than the 
product. The agency could pre-certify developers that “demonstrate a culture of 
quality and organizational excellence based on objective criteria.”50 Such criteria 
can include excellent software design, development, or validation and testing, and 
the pre-certified developers could market low-risk devices without additional 
review (or at least less rigorous review). FDA accepted nine companies to 
 
(adopting international industry principles created by the International Medical Device Regulators 
Forum (IMDRF)). 
 
45 SAMD GUIDANCE, supra note 44, at 4, 7, 12. For example, the Guidance requires clinical 
evaluation to be “iterative and continuous” and include independent review. 
 
46 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DIGITAL HEALTH INNOVATION ACTION PLAN (2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/106331/download. 
 
47 Id. at 2. 
 
48 Id. at 2–3 (stating that FDA did not focus oversight or enforce compliance for low-risk mobile 
apps; technologies that only transmit, store, or data; and products that only promote general 
wellness). 
 







participate in the Pre-Cert pilot program in August 2017.51 It stated in the NPRM 
that one factor in eligibility for the program is measured on “Key Performance 
Indicators” or similar measures but made no specific mention of nondiscrimination 
measures. 
Recently, the FDA released a draft guidance around Clinical Decision 
Support (CDS) software—software that includes computerized alerts for patients 
and providers, condition-specific order sets, diagnostic support, and more.52 The 
CDS guidance specifically applies to such software that make patient-specific 
recommendations to a health care provider, such as possible diagnosis, 
recommended treatment plans, and recommended diagnostic tests.53 Key to this 
definition is that the CDS function must not be independently reviewed by a 
healthcare provider (labelled “Device CDS”).54 A healthcare AI can escape FDA 
enforcement under the guidance (labelled “Non-Device CDS”) if the manufacturer 
provides a plain-language description of the software (including the intended use 
and intended user), the data inputs required to generate a recommendation (e.g., 
patient’s age), and the basis for the recommendation.55 To adequately describe the 
basis-for-recommendation, the guidance requires software developers to “describe 
the underlying data used to develop the algorithm and [] include plain language 
descriptions of the logic or rationale used by the algorithm to render a 
recommendation.”56 Even for those Device CDSs that the FDA has authority to 
regulate, the agency stated it intends to focus enforcement efforts on “serious or 
critical situations or conditions” where the provider is unable to independently 
review the Device CDS’s recommendation—e.g., machine-learning algorithms that 
categorize symptoms of flus, software that identifies signs of opioid addiction, and 
 
51 Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan for Digital Health Devises; Software Precertification Pilot 
Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 35,216, 35,217 (July 28, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2017-07-28/pdf/2017-15891.pdf (noting that nine companies were selected to participate in the 
pilot: Apple, Fitbit, Johnson & Johnson, Pear Therapeutics, Phosphorus, Roche, Samsung, 
Tidepool, and Verily); Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, FDA.GOV, 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/digital-health-software-precertification-pre-
cert-program (last visited Mar. 10, 2020). 
 
52 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 5 (Sept. 27, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/109618/download [hereinafter CDS DRAFT GUIDANCE]. The guidance 
clarifies that CDS are different from SaMD in that they are only intended to be used as a support 
by providing recommendations, rather than providers relying primarily on the CDS 
recommendations. 
 
53 Id. at 6–7, 11. In line with the 21st Century Cures Act, the CDS guidance addresses software 
that is not excluded from the definition of medical device (i.e., software that provides heath 
recommendations about prevention, diagnoses, or treatment without an opportunity for 
independent review by a physician). 
 
54 See 21st Century Cures Act, supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 










B. Barriers and Improvements to the FDA’s Approach 
 
The nature of the FDA’s oversight of AI technology creates certain 
compliance challenges for providers and AI developers, and leaves patients at risk 
of discrimination. First, the lack of enforced regulations or guidance at this time 
means there is little accountability for the AI developers to ensure that algorithms 
and software do not perpetuate biases.58 
Second, the patchwork of guidance and proposed regulatory frameworks 
leaves several gaps in the enforcement around AI. Most importantly, FDA 
regulation authority is limited to medical devices—those that play a role in 
diagnosis and treatment of disease—they can never extend to AI used for 
administrative purposes, which can have an equally discriminatory impact on 
healthcare consumers.59 This caveat in the statutory language leaves a large hole in 
terms of enforcement authority; absent amendments to the statute, the FDA will 
never be able to regulate biases in insurance-rating AI or AI used to identify social 
determinants of health. 
Furthermore, the added caveats introduced by the 21st Century Cures Act 
leave a large portion of healthcare AI technology unregulated. Per the Act and the 
FDA’s draft guidance document, Non-Device CDSs are those technologies where 
physicians maintain primacy and manufacturers ensure transparency (e.g., by 
describing the algorithm’s rationale).60 As discussed in Part IV, a method of 
countering AI bias is to require information about its design, testing, and rationale 
to be available to providers and patients.61 There is clearly tension between the 
FDA’s approach and what researchers and advocates agree is a necessary step to 
limit the discriminatory effects of AI bias. It seems that the FDA will not be able to 
regulate healthcare AI if the manufacturers provide even limited opportunity for 
 
 
57 Id. at 14, 23. Similarly, it will focus regulatory oversight over CDS’s intended for patients that 
conducts continuous glucose monitoring, assess patient’s stress/anxiety to provide treatment 
recommendations, or providers recommendations to caregivers of children with cystic fibrosis 
about when to bring the child to the ER. 
 
58 See generally id. at 14 (noting at the top of the CDS guidance document “Contains Nonbinding 
Recommendations”) (emphasis added). 
 
59 Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(1)(A). 
 
60 CDS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 12. 
 





physicians to exercise independent judgement by giving cursory descriptions of the 
AI rationale.62 
The FDA also specifically noted in its draft CDS guidance that it does not 
intend to enforce compliance for devices that inform providers for “non-serious 
situations or conditions” such as recommendations for allergens and common cold 
symptoms, alerts for cholesterol management, or recommendations of over-the-
counter drugs.63 Even for those Device CDSs that the FDA can regulate, it will only 
regulate a small percentage. Although the “serious situations and conditions” that 
the FDA plans to focus its attention present a higher risk of medical harm, even 
low-risk conditions have a high likelihood of discrimination if AI is used. Bias does 
not distinguish between high-risk and low-risk diseases, even something as simple 
as an AI that recommends over-the-counter medication can cause unnecessary pain 
if the AI tends to not recommend the medication to certain individuals.  
Lastly, none of the FDA’s proposed frameworks adequately address the 
potential for disparate impacts on certain groups, which is a missed opportunity to 
ensure that AI developers incorporate nondiscrimination elements (e.g., through 
feedback loops) at the design and production stage. In the limited instances where 
the FDA does plan to regulate Device CDS, it is likely that its focus will be 
primarily on safety and effectiveness rather than AI bias.64 While the Digital Health 
Innovation Action Plan seeks a “culture of quality” among AI developers in the 
proposed pre-certification program, it still fails to specifically address 
discrimination.65 The FDA should include in its pre-certification criterion a 
requirement that manufacturers must attest to factors like commitment to 
nondiscrimination, review of training data for bias, and testing for disparate-impact. 
Not only is there a regulatory gap, but also a compliance gap. Ordinarily, 
organizations develop their compliance programs around federal and state 
regulations; where technology is just emerging and the government has not yet 
caught up, organizations may find it difficult to identify the appropriate standards 
to which they should hold themselves. Similar dilemmas are arising in other 
industries where AI is emerging, such as the criminal justice system. California 
recently introduced a bill to regulate the use of AI in pretrial risk-assessment tools 
used by courts in place of bond hearings that received responses from several 
advocacy groups with recommendations of specific measures to reduce the risk of 
 
62 See CDS DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 52, at 12 (providing an example that a physician would 
be unable exercise independent judgement where the information provided by the manufacturer 
“could not be expected to be independently understood”). 
 
63 Id. at 20–21. Similarly, it does not intend to enforce regulations against devices where the 
patient has primacy to make decisions (such as to take allergy medication recommended by the 
CDS). 
 
64 See generally Elias Mallis, An Introduction to FDA’s Regulation of Medical Devices, FDA.GOV, 
https://www.fda.gov/media/123602/download (last visited Apr. 2, 2020). 
 





bias.66 In the absence of regulation around healthcare AI, providers, hospitals, and 
AI developers should take a cautious approach –limit AI to technology that has 
been tested for equality and its use to situations where risk of bias is lowest. 
Healthcare AI instruments should be designed so that no patient of a suspect 
class  is unduly burdened by its errors. There are several measures of fairness that 
the FDA should require AI developers to use during design and testing, including 
error rate balance and predictive parity.67 The agency should look for a combination 
of such measures that is most apt to avoid discrimination.68 The FDA, and AI 
developers and healthcare entities, should remain open to input from the 
community (such as advocacy groups) and independent data to identify the best 
fairness measures.69 In the context of pretrial risk-assessment tools, advocacy 
groups in this context argue that “the design of any tool should always give far 
greater weight to the avoidance of false positives than to the avoidance of false 
negatives” because the detriment of erroneously detaining a person is worse than 
erroneously releasing one.70  In the context of healthcare AI, however, the risks are 
less clear—is it a greater threat to the health and safety of patients to not diagnose 
an illness at all or to misdiagnose it as something else? Medical professionals 
should carefully consider and balance these risks to inform AI design and 
organization policies and procedures to ensure that risks (particularly risks arising 
out of bias) are mitigated to the fullest extent possible. Relatedly, the datasets used 
to train AI must be vetted for correctness and reliability.  
Advocacy groups in the risk-threat context suggest “transparent and 
periodic examination” of relevant factors—in the healthcare context, this might 
include review of timely diagnoses, treatment success and adherence, and 
rehospitalization rates by race, age, gender, and disability.71 Although there are 
currently no regulations, AI developers and healthcare entities can develop their 
own internal criterion to achieve transparency.72 Implementing such internal 
 
66 See THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS CONCERNS 3, http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-
Full.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2020) [hereinafter STATEMENT ON RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS]. 
 
67 See id. at 3. Other methods of algorithmic fairness include: Fairness through blindness (i.e., 
exclusion of factors related to protected class); Group Fairness; Statistical Parity; Equal Group 
Error Rates (the rate of false negatives and positives is the same for all groups); Individual 
Fairness (same outcome regardless of patient’s group); Predictive Parity (equalized positive 
predictive values); and Similarity Measures (classifications based on similar characteristics 
relevant to a particular task). See Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact 
Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 91 (2017–18). 
 
68 See STATEMENT ON RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS, supra note 66, at 3. 
 
69 See id. 
 
70 See id. at 4. 
 
71 See id. at 4–5. 
 




controls will ensure that the healthcare industry is prepared to immediately adapt 
to any regulations promulgated by the FDA (or other agencies) in the future. 
IV. UNTESTED WATERS: THE ROLE OF NONDISCRIMINATION IN 
HEALTHCARE AI 
Discriminatory effects from AI in other industries may be governed by 
federal nondiscrimination laws. For example, administrative agencies are 
increasingly using AI to make eligibility determinations for public benefits.73 
Where constitutionally protected property interests are at stake, the use of AI may 
present a procedural due process problem due to the lack of transparency (which 
affects the meaningful opportunity to challenge).74 Where AI intentionally treats 
persons differently based on factors such as race or gender, the Equal Protection 
Clause may apply.75 Similarly, facially neutral policies that disparately impact 
certain populations may run afoul the disparate-impact provisions of civil rights 
statutes. For example, employers frequently use machine-learning tools for resume 
screening, hiring and retention decisions, and identifying employees for 
promotions. Where employees and prospective employees have been discriminated 
against by these tools, they may pursue specific causes of action per disparate-
impact (and business necessity) principles of Title VII.76 
These remedies, however, do not extend to any discrimination resulting 
from the use of AI in the healthcare context. There is no constitutional property 
right to receive, for example, a correct diagnosis or specific treatment plan. 
Similarly, there is no such right to coverage for certain services and items or to be 
selected to participate in special health programs. Thus, when covered entities use 
AI to diagnose, treatment, and monitor patients, or in billing and utilization review, 
 
 
73 Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision-Making In The 
Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147 (2017). 
 
74 But see id. at 1186 (arguing that the use of algorithms in public benefits determinations is 
actually more likely to survive the Mathews balancing-test for procedural due process because it is 
perceived to reduce human prejudice). 
 
75 However, facially neutral laws or regulations that have a disparate impact on suspect classes are 
insufficient to trigger the Equal Protection Clause. See Interview by Leslie Garfield Tenzer with 
Emily Gold Waldman, Dean, Pace L. Sch. (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://lawtofact.buzzsprout.com/138309/1027580-the-equal-protection-clause-and- (explaining 
that there needs to be both disparate impact and a showing of intent behind a facially neutral law 
to trigger heightened review). 
 
76 Raub, supra note 22, at 544–53. Moreover, federal agencies using AI could also pose a 
nondelegation issue under Article I of the Constitution. See generally Coglianese & Lehr, supra 
note 73, at 1178 (noting that, although broad delegation to administrative agencies has been a 
long-accepted practice of Congress, “the law has always assumed that the recipient of that 





constitutional protections may not apply.77 The lack of protections and remedies for 
affected patients is not only due to the fact that our “statutory and constitutional 
schemes are poorly crafted to address issues of private, algorithmic discrimination” 
but also because the black-box effect created by the proprietary nature of such 
algorithms makes it difficult for patients to discover such effects.78 
While most aspects of healthcare are not constitutionally protected, one 
federal statute does shield patients from discrimination: Section 1557 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).79 Section 1557 is the 
nondiscrimination provision that prohibits certain health systems from 
discriminating against patients on the basis of race, sex, national origin, disability 
and other characteristics.80 It provides that: 
[A]n individual shall not . . . be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any 
health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal 
financial assistance, . . . or under any program or activity that is 
administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established 
under this title.81 
Section 1557 applies to any health program or activity, any part of which 
receives federal financial assistance, is administered by a federal agency, or is 
established under the ACA—this includes not only physicians and hospitals, but 
 
77 Katyal, supra note 22, at 99 (“Like the civil rights era that came before it, AI is implicated 
within a vast array of decisions that come, not from the government, but from the private sector, 
even if many of them implicate civil rights in the process. For example, the right to be considered 
for employment, free from consideration of one's disability--the right at issue in the Kyle Behm 
case just discussed--directly correlates to the right to work. Similarly, the right to an education, the 
right to vote, the right to make contracts, the right to travel, the right to get insurance, and the right 
to receive information, among others, are all at issue when an algorithm makes its (private) 
decisions about who does and who does not receive the entitlement and the conditions attached to 
it. Those decisions are not always subject to public oversight. And even more problematically, 
they may be shielded from view, due to trade secrecy and systemic opacity.”). 
 
78 See id. at 100 (noting further that these effects from the lack of transparency pose issues in non-
private industries as well, for example discovering Fourth Amendment violations when AI is used 
as a predictive policing tool). 
 
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018). While other federal nondiscrimination statutes exist, they are 
not sweeping enough to cover all discrimination in all industries. See, e.g., Doe v. BlueCross 
BlueShield of Tennessee, 926 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting in dicta that the Americans with 
Disabilities Act may not actually protect those covered by private insurance). For a discussion on 
why Title VI of the Civil Rights Act has been ineffective in preventing discrimination by federally 
funded healthcare entities, see Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil 
Rights, Health Reform, Race and Equity, 55 HOWARD L.J. 855, 860–70 (2012). 
 







also insurers.82 These entities are prohibited from excluding an individual from 
participating in or receiving the benefits, or otherwise discriminating against an 
individual, on the grounds prohibited under: (1) Title VI of the Civil Rights of 1964, 
(2) Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, (3) the Age Discrimination Act 
of 1975, or (4) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Stated simply, the statute and 
regulations implementing Section 1557 prohibit health entities from discriminating 
against patients on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, age, or disability.  
A. Section 1557: Enforcement 
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) within the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services is tasked with implementing and enforcing Section 1557. OCR 
receives complaints about Section 1557 violations and conducts “compliance 
reviews” to investigate such discrimination claims.83 If a compliance review reveals 
noncompliance (that is within OCR’s jurisdiction), OCR first attempts to reach a 
voluntary agreement to remedy the discrimination.84 However, if the covered entity 
does not voluntarily resolve the issue in a satisfactory manner, OCR will issue a 
Letter of Findings to outline why the entity is noncompliant and OCR’s next steps 
(including referral to DOJ for enforcement steps to terminate federal financial 
assistance).85 Since the implementation of Section 1557, there have only been fifty-
eight publicly available resolutions.86 A few examples: 
● Touro Infirmary Emergency Department of Louisiana (sex discrimination): 
OCR investigated a claim after a patient alleged he was denied appropriate 
care and treatment after a domestic violence incident, and was subject to 
rude comments based on his gender (male).87  
 
82 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Section 1557: Coverage of Health Insurance in Marketplaces 
and Other Health Plans, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-
1557/fs-health-insurance/index.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2016). Not covered, however, are third 
party administrators of self-insured plans. See 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 3,1432 (May 18, 2016) 
(“Third party administrators are generally not responsible for the benefit design of the self-insured 
plans they administer and that ERISA (and likely the contracts into which third party 
administrators enter with the plan sponsors) requires plans to be administered consistent with their 
terms.”). 
 
83 See Exec. Order No. 13,160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,775 (June 23, 2000), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 2000d 
(complaint procedures); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, How OCR Enforces Civil Rights 
Discrimination Laws and Regulations, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-




85 Id.  
 
86 For a list of recent Resolution Agreements by OCR, see OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Recent Civil 
Rights Resolution Agreements & Compliance Reviews, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/civil-
rights/for-providers/compliance-enforcement/agreements/index.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). 
 
87 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OCR Enforcement under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care 




● Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (PDHS) (discrimination on 
the basis of nationality—limited English proficiency): OCR investigated 
two complaints regarding access to programs in the PDHS Office of Income 
Maintenance by individuals with limited English proficiency (LEP) because 
they did not receive appropriate language services and were thus hindered 
from obtaining benefits in a timely manner.88  
● Mid-Maryland Muskoskeletal Institute (MMI) (disability discrimination): 
OCR received a complaint that MMI violated Section 1557 by 
discriminating against the complainant and her minor son on the basis of 
their deafness because MMI failed to provide a qualified sign language 
interpreter.89  
● Office of African American Children’s Services (OAACS) (race 
discrimination): OCR received a complaint regarding OAACS’s use of 
“racial classifications as the sole factor in determining which children” in a 
region of Washington state received child protective and welfare services 
in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.90  
Like most healthcare statutes, Section 1557 presents a significant 
compliance responsibility for covered entities. OCR has not yet investigated any 
discrimination complaints regarding the use of AI by a covered entity, nor has it 
issued any guidance about how it might treat discrimination that originates from 
AI. Absent such information, covered entities can use the existing Voluntary 
Resolution Agreements as a starting point when developing their compliance 
programs.  
As AI continues to permeate the healthcare industry, covered entities will 
need to revise their written policies and procedures to ensure that their existing 
nondiscrimination policies extend to AI usage. For example, if AI systems are used 
to identify certain patients as being victims of domestic violence, there should be 
 
1557/ocr-enforcement-section-1557-aca-sex-discrimination/index.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) 
(sex discrimination) [hereinafter OCR Enforcement of Touro Infirmary]. 
 
88 VOLUNTARY RESOLUTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND PENNSYLVANIA DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS. 2 (2019), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hhs-padhs-vra.pdf (discrimination based on race, ethnicity 
or national origin) [hereinafter OCR ENFORCEMENT OF PDHS]. 
 
89 VOLUNTARY RESOLUTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND MID-MARYLAND MUSKOSKELETAL INSTITUTE 2 (2019), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/MMI-vra.pdf (discrimination on the basis of disability) 
[hereinafter OCR ENFORCEMENT OF MMI]. 
 
90 VOLUNTARY RESOLUTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, AND THE 
WASHINGTON STATE DEP’T OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERVS. 1 (2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/oaacs_ra.pdf (discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or 
national origin) [hereinafter OCR ENFORCEMENT OF OAACS]. OCR received this complaint prior 
to the passage of Section 1557, however, the agency uses this as an example of how it enforces the 





policies to ensure that the system’s identification is gender neutral.91 Similarly, 
covered entities can develop criteria for their AI that reflect nondiscrimination 
principles and ensure that the software they purchase, create, or commission meets 
their requirements. For example, covered entities can create assessment criteria for 
AI that is used to identify patients who would benefit from auxiliary aids for their 
disabilities (e.g., to ensure those with rare disabilities are not excluded) or from 
interpretation services because they are limited English proficient (e.g., to ensure 
that those who speak less common languages can still access an interpreter).92 
Entities must also consider designating a nondiscrimination coordinator 
specifically for their AI usage to effectuate and oversee these policies.93 
Importantly, covered entities should continue to monitor AI 
determinations—in both clinical and administrative purposes—to identify patterns 
of disparate impact. Review of AI decisions should be incorporated into entities’ 
scheduled audit plans and should be done regularly. In addition to looking factors 
such as data-privacy or error-rates, these audits must include a review of 
discrimination patterns.94 To protect against confirmation-bias by covered entities’ 
officers and executives, they should also hire external auditors.95 Third-party 
contractors will be particularly useful for auditing AI usage because the entities’ 
internal officers likely do not possess the requisite computer-science background 
to review the source codes to identify which data elements are contributing to the 
disparate impact. Monitoring and auditing alone is of course insufficient; covered 
entities must also develop strategic plans to timely remedy any biases they discover 
and should cease use of the AI until the discriminatory effects can be eliminated 
with some certainty.96 Not only will this internal-remedy approach reflect covered 
 
91 See, e.g., OCR Enforcement of Touro Infirmary, supra note 87 (requiring Touro Infirmary 
Emergency Department of Louisiana to revise its protocol to reflect-gender neutral procedures 
around domestic violence incidents). 
 
92 See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF MMI, supra note 89, at 9 (requiring the Institute to use 
specific factors created by OCR to prioritize patients requiring auxiliary aids and qualified 
interpreters). 
 
93 See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF PDHS, supra note 88, at 7 (requiring the Pennsylvania agency 
to designate a “language assistance coordinator” in light of an investigation). See also 42 C.F.R. 
§ 92.7(a) (2019) (stating that covered entities of more than fifteen employees are already required 
to designate someone to oversee its Section 1557 program). 
 
94 See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF OAACS, supra note 90, at 4 (requiring the state office to 
conduct follow up assessments on its newly developed race-neutral policies). 
 
95 See STATEMENT ON RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS, supra note 66, at 3 (“When possible, that 
quantitative data should be audited by an agency or institution independent from actors within the 
system to avoid biased statistical reporting.”). 
 
96 See id. at 3 (“If the use of a particular pretrial risk assessment instrument by itself does not result 
in an independently audited, measurable decrease in the number of people detained pretrial, the 
tool should be pulled from use until it is recalibrated to cause demonstrably decarceral results.”). 
While some scholars speculate that attempts to remedy disparate impact by intentionally re-




entities commitment to nondiscrimination, “voluntary action” is also the preferred 
remedy under Section 1557 regulations.97  
To ensure that these nondiscrimination policies are in effect on the ground, 
providers (e.g., physicians, nurses) and administrative staff (e.g., medical billers, 
intake and discharge staff, and even personnel working in the social services offices 
at hospitals and clinics) need to be trained on Section 1557.98 As of now, AI in 
healthcare does not have primacy—human beings are still able and expected to 
review the AI’s predictions and decide how to proceed. Covered entities need to 
clarify what conduct is not permitted (e.g., accepting AI determinations without 
additional review) and consistently discipline staff who violate the AI-
nondiscrimination policies.99 This human aspect should be more than a last-line-of-
defense to detect medical or coding errors, but should also recognize discrimination 
under Section 1557. For example, if an AI makes a prediction based on a patients’ 
answer to a questionnaire, then the medical staff should recognize that such 
prediction might run afoul Section 1557 if the patient did not receive interpreter 
services if the patient is LEP. 
A hallmark of a robust compliance program is an effective reporting and 
complaint mechanism. Covered entities should already have anonymous reporting 
 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. Stefano, others argue that fixing AI to avoid foreseeable 
disparate impact liability is permissible. Compare Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 694–95 (2017) (“The holding in Ricci suggests that we cannot solely rely 
on auditing for legal reasons . . . If an agency runs an algorithm that has a disparate impact, 
correcting those results after the fact will trigger the same kind of analysis as New Haven's 
rejection of its firefighter test results.”), with Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for 
Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 130 (2017–18) 
(arguing that Ricci does not compel such strict barriers and as long as an agency can foresee 
disparate impact through “a strong belief in evidence” it can adopt a less biased policy if it does 
not require taking a benefit away from the individuals who received it under the original policy). 
 
97 45 C.F.R. § 92.6(b); see, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF OAACS, supra note 90, at 1 (explaining 
that the state office voluntarily developed its own “Disproportionality Action Plan” to end the 
practice of referring and transferring children based on their race, prior to an OCR investigation). 
Additionally, it would be wise to involve corporate counsel in the ongoing monitoring of 
healthcare AI systems. See STATEMENT ON RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS, supra note 66, at 4–5 
(“Defense counsel must be included in the process of selecting, calibrating, designing, shaping, 
and testing a pretrial risk assessment instrument and included in the ongoing evaluation of the 
tool.”). 
 
98 See, e.g., OCR Enforcement of Touro Infirmary, supra note 87 (requiring Touro to train 
emergency department staff to identify domestic violence victims); OCR ENFORCEMENT OF 
PDHS, supra note 88, at 13 (requiring the Pennsylvania agency to train all relevant staff who have 
regular contact with benefits applicants on interpreter-services policies); OCR ENFORCEMENT OF 
MMI, supra note 89, at 11 (requiring the Institute to train all staff about Section 1557 and policies 
regarding provision of auxiliary aids); OCR ENFORCEMENT OF OAACS, supra note 90, at 6 
(requiring the state office to train all staff on Title VI and internal nondiscrimination obligations). 
 
99 See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF PDHS, supra note 88, at 9 (prohibiting employees from using 





lines and enforced anti-retaliation policies (for internal whistleblowers);100 it should 
be clear to employees, senior officers, and vendors that these mechanisms can also 
receive Section 1557 complaints. Similarly, covered entities should implement 
grievance procedures (for patients) to report possible Section 1557 violations when 
AI is used to make treatment decisions, billing activities, etc. relating to a patient.101 
One can question the usefulness of reporting mechanisms when most of an AI’s 
decision-making is made behind a digital curtain—will patients even know if 
they’ve been discriminated against? In order to make grievance procedures for 
patients meaningful, covered entities should (a) notify patients when AI is used in 
relation to them and (b) explicitly advertise the grievance procedures where patients 
are likely to see them.102 
A criticism of implementing compliance policies around Section 1557-AI 
claims is that covered entities can use their robust policy as a shield in OCR 
investigations. Given that healthcare AI is still (relatively) in its infancy and that 
OCR has not yet addressed it, OCR may defer to covered entities’ interpretation of 
appropriate Section 1557 compliance in this realm. This can lead to the obvious 
pitfall of OCR never engaging in meaningful review of discrimination when AI is 
used. One method of combatting this is of course for the healthcare industry to set 
a high standard for itself; covered entities should properly vet the AI developers 
they partner with to ensure they incorporate Section 1557 principles in their original 
designs.103 
From the perspective of a covered entity, Section 1557 is an important legal 
obligation for one major reason: failure to comply can lead to termination of federal 
financial assistance.104 In most cases, loss of such assistance is fatal to the continued 
existence of the covered entity.105 However, the threat of Section 1557 enforcement 
 
100 45 C.F.R. § 92.7(b) (requiring covered entities with more than fifteen employees to adopt 
Section 1557 grievance procedures). 
 
101 See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF OAACS, supra note 90, at 6 (requiring the development of a 
complaint resolution procedure); OCR ENFORCEMENT OF MMI, supra note 89, at 6 (requiring the 
Institute to revise its grievance procedures); OCR ENFORCEMENT OF PDHS, supra note 88, at 7 
(requiring the state agency to update its standard procedures for receiving limited-English-
proficient complaints). 
 
102 See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF PDHS, supra note 88, at 10 (requiring PDHS to use posters, a 
website, written notices, and telephonic interpreters at points of contact to ensure patients with 
LEP needs are identified). 
 
103 Such vetting indicates a need for regulation at the design state of healthcare AI, not just on the 
application stage that OCR oversees. This will be discussed further in Part IV. 
 
104 45 C.F.R. § 92.302(c). 
 
105 For a Chicago hospital that lost its federal money due to investigations about abuse, 80% of 
their patients were insured Medicare or Medicaid; its third highest source of revenue was from 
BlueCross, under which only 9% of patients were insured. See Duaa Eldeib, Chicago Psychiatric 
Hospital Will Lose Federal Money, and Its License Is Threatened After Allegations of Abuse, 




lacks the oomph that other healthcare enforcement actions carry. When OCR 
investigations result in Voluntary Resolution Agreements, if the party fails to 
substantially comply with the Agreement, the result is that the “parties will confer 
and attempt to reach agreement as to what steps may be necessary to resolve the 
compliance issues to both parties’ satisfaction.”106 Compare this with enforcement 
threats in other areas of healthcare—such as fraud and abuse laws—where the 
failure to comply with the law is met with hefty fines.107 
Moreover, OCR’s enforcement of Section 1557 has been relatively sparse 
and limited in scope—particularly under the Trump Administration.108 In mid-
2019, the Department of Health and Human Services proposed “substantial 
revisions” to Section 1557—namely eliminating protection of transgender 
individuals, adopting blanket religious freedom exemptions for providers, and 
weakening protections for individuals with limited English proficiency.109 
Conscience and religious freedom were the main focal points of OCR under the 
Trump Administration, beginning with Trump’s Executive Order “Promoting Free 
Speech and Religious Liberty”110 and the creation of the Conscience and Religious 
Freedom Division within OCR.111 By their own report, enforcing civil rights was 
only about a quarter of OCR’s workload, and the majority of that time has focused 
 
psychiatric-hospital-will-lose-federal-money-and-its-license-is-threatened-after-allegations-of-
abuse (noting that patients are also harmed when hospitals lose federal funding). 
 
106 See, e.g., OCR ENFORCEMENT OF MMI, supra note 89, at 4. 
 
107 False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2018) ($5,000–$10,000 per claim); Anti-
Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2018) ($100,000); Civil Monetary Penalties Law, 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(o) (2018) ($50,000 per false claim); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(3) (2018) ($15,000 
per service). 
 
108 Letter from Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights to Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. & Roger Severino, Director, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs. (Mar. 30, 2017), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2017/OCR%20Letter_1557_3-30-17.pdf (noting that 
under the Obama Administration, OCR “accepted, investigated, and resolved discrimination 
complaints alleged violations under Section 1557”) [hereinafter Leadership Conference Letter]. 
 
109 See Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. 
27,846 (June 14, 2019).  
 
110 Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017). 
 
111 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Conscience and Religious Freedom News Releases & Bulletins, 
HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/conscience/newsroom/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2021); see 
also Emmarie Huetteman, At Trump administration’s new health office, ‘civil rights’ means 
doctors have a right to say no to patients, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Mar. 6, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/practices/civil-rights-means-doctors-right-to-say-no-to-patients 
(noting that an HHS spokesperson reported a “clear surge” in conscience-related complaints under 





on the conscience rights rule.112 Enforcement of Section 1557 is necessary because 
it can prevent and remedy discrimination at “every step in the healthcare system, 
from obtaining insurance coverage to receiving a proper diagnosis and 
treatment.”113 The limited nature of OCR enforcement of Section 1557 generally 
may lead patients to feel unprotected by the agency when AI is used. 
B. Section 1557: Private Right of Action 
Healthcare consumers themselves have a private right of action under 
Section 1557 for allegations of intentional discrimination, giving them the ability 
to file a lawsuit against a covered entity directly rather than filing a complaint with 
OCR. To state a claim under Section 1557, plaintiffs must show that they (1) were 
a member of a protected class, (2) qualified for the benefit/program at issue, (3) 
suffered an adverse action, and (4) the adverse action gave rise to an inference of 
discrimination.114 
However, there is a circuit split as to whether Section 1557 provides for a 
private right of action for disparate-impact claims. Some courts have permitted 
disparate-impact liability for all grounds prohibited under Section 1557; they justify 
that it would lead to absurd and inconsistent results if only some plaintiffs could 
proceed without a showing of intentional discrimination.115 Other courts, however, 
have held that Section 1557 allows for disparate impact liability only where the 
originating statutory basis provided for it.116 Recall that Section 1557 incorporates 
different civil rights statutes (e.g., Civil Rights Act), not all of which allow for 
actions under a disparate-impact theory.117 Despite the fact the OCR issued a 
guidance letter explicitly stating that the agency recognized a private right of action 
for disparate impact discrimination, these courts argue that the letter is clearly 
 
112 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2021 BUDGET IN BRIEF 171–72 (2021), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/index.html (noting that 73% of the workload is on HIPAA). 
 
113 Leadership Conference Letter, supra note 108, at 1. 
 
114 See Griffin v. General Electric Co., 752 Fed. Appx. 947, 949 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 
115 Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, No. 14-cv-20137 (SRN/FLN), 2015 WL 1197415, at 
*11–12 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (holding that Congress referenced the four civil rights statute 
merely to identify the grounds for prohibited discrimination, but reaching the question of what 
standard does apply). 
 
116 Briscoe v. Health Care Services Corp., 281 F. Supp.3d 725, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (sex 
discrimination under Title XI of the Civil Rights Act); Southern Pennsylvania Transport Authority 
v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 3d 688 (E.D. Penn. 2015) (race discrimination under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act). 
 
117  There is no private right of action for disparate impact claims under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). There is, however, a private right of 
action under Title IX, the Age Discrimination Employment Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973. See Gesber v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Smith v. City 





contrary to Congress’s intent and does not deserve Chevron deference.118 Judge 
Sutton’s commentary in Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee sums up the 
mindset of these courts: “Treating similarly situated people differently goes to the 
heart of invidious discrimination. But treating differently situated people differently 
usually counts as equal justice under law.”119 
Due to the circuit split on disparate-impact liability for Section 1557, claims 
can be fatal for many individuals seeking relief through a private lawsuit for 
discrimination they faced because of healthcare AI. As the UnitedHealth case study 
reported, factors related to a suspect class (in that case, race) are not expected to be 
explicitly included in the AI’s algorithm; yet biases can enter and manifest through 
other factors (in that case, cost history).120 The types of claims that private plaintiffs 
might pursue will clearly fit the definition of disparate-impact liability—i.e., 
facially neutral policies that have a discriminatory effect. In the circuits where 
disparate-impact liability is not always permitted, patients seeking redress for the 
effects of AI biases on racial grounds are unlikely to prevail.121 
Even in the states that do permit disparate-impact liability—or in the rare 
cases where a patient can show intentional discrimination—the odds of plaintiffs 
prevailing are low. Section 1557 lawsuits are few and far in between.122 When 
brought, they are often decided in favor of the healthcare covered entity.123 As a 
result, patients who feel the brunt of bias in healthcare AI have little hope for 
recourse under Section 1557 complaints to OCR or private lawsuits.  
 
118 E.g., Briscoe v. Health Care Services Corp., 281 F. Supp.3d 725, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (noting 
that if Congress intended for there to be a single standard of liability, it would not have included 
each enforcement mechanism of each statute it incorporated); see also Rumble, 2015 WL 
1197415, at *10 (holding that OCR’s opinion letter is not controlling, but could receive Skidmore 
deference as a persuasive document). 
 
119 Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 
120 Obermeyer et al., supra note 1, at 452. 
121 See Doe, 926 F.3d at 241 (holding that a policy that required all patients to switch to a special 
network pharmacy for high-cost drugs, rather than their local pharmacy, is neutral on its face and 
did not intentionally discriminate against patients with HIV on the basis of disability). 
 
122 At the time of publication, the author could only find 19 pending or decided cases referencing 
Section 1557 when running the appropriate Westlaw search. (search terms “42 U.S.C. 18116,” 
then Citing References and “Yes” to “Referenced in Notes of Decisions”). 
 
123 See, e.g., Tovar v. Essentia Health, 857 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 2017) (Benon, J., concurring in 
part) (dismissing because the plaintiff named the third-party administrator of a self-insured plan, 
and not the employer, as the defendant); see also Griffin v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc, 746 Fed. 
App’x 873, 874 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding that the alleged plaintiff could not demonstrate 
discrimination by an employer-based health plan based on its “litigation conduct” when it chose 






V. COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES 
A. Licensing 
Federal agencies, such as the FDA or OCR in Health and Human Services, 
do not have authority to regulate healthcare providers themselves—that task is left 
to the states. Various state medical licensing boards regulate the practice of 
medicine by physicians, as well as nurses and technicians. While the Federation of 
State Medical Boards similarly recognizes the need for regulation around AI,124 
state licensing boards may not be able to regulate AI because it fails to meet the 
most basic hook for their authority—practice of medicine.125 As of now, physicians 
maintain primacy; it is presumed that the AI does not make decisions, it simply 
recommends them.126  
Licensed physicians are held to certain standards of conduct based on 
ethical guidelines (transparency, truthfulness) and legal obligations (reasonable 
care, confidentiality, informed consent).127 Nearly all medical professionals are 
required to participate in continuing education (CE) hours as well in order to 
maintain their license; some states require certain professionals to take CE hours 
related to a subject of cultural competency (e.g., LGBTQ, HIV/AIDS).128 Federal 
guidelines fill in gaps where states have not developed such standards. For example, 
OCR’s Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting 
Limited English Proficient Persons,129 or the Office of Minority Health’s National 
Standard for Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services (CLAS) in Health 
 
124 See Artificial Intelligence, FED’N OF ST. MED. BOARDS, https://www.fsmb.org/ai/ (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2020). The FSMB has also created a workgroup consisting of stakeholders, including from 
the American Medical Association, to provide resources to state medical boards on the effects of 
AI on patient safety and quality of healthcare. See FED’N OF ST. MED. BOARDS, Res. 18–6, 
WORKGROUP ON AI AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY OF CARE IN 
MEDICAL PRACTICE (2018), https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/artificial-intelligence/pdfs/2018-ai-
resolution.pdf. 
 
125 See Terry, supra note 9, at 154. 
 
126 See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE DRAFT 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/109618/download (discussing the support role of CDS, including 
machine learning, but also discussing SaMD that drives clinical management and SaMD that 




128 Board of Medicine, DC.GOV, https://dchealth.dc.gov/bomed (last visited Mar. 10, 2020) 
(requiring LGBTQ and HIV/AIDS cultural competency courses for Medical Doctors, Doctors of 
Osteopathic Medicine, and Physicians Assistants). 
 
129 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE TO FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
RECIPIENTS REGARDING TITLE VI PROHIBITION AGAINST NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION 





and Health Care.130 While neither comprehensive nor necessarily binding, the 
guidance and CE requirements still ensure that there is at least some understanding 
of health disparities in certain communities. There is no guarantee that such 
guidelines are applied consistently or uniformly, but there is something to be said 
about human element behind traditional healthcare.131  
In the context of pretrial detainment decisions, advocacy groups 
recommend that courts abide by an AI determinations only if it recommends release 
(and if the algorithm does not recommend immediate release, it should recommend 
a pretrial hearing involving rigorous safeguards).132 Borrowing from this approach, 
state licensing boards can write their policies to ensure that that if AI is used, it is 
used only in contexts with the lowest potential for harm (e.g., for treatment 
maintenance, but not diagnosis; or to diagnose common colds, but not cancers). In 
line with this least-approach harm, providers should include in their compliance 
program that providers can follow diagnostic AI determinations if it does make a 
diagnosis, but if the AI does not make a diagnosis there should be a rigorous 
independent review by the physician to protect against delayed diagnosis.133 
B. Malpractice Liability 
Traditional tort liability for medical malpractice also extends to 
discrimination by healthcare providers. There are mountains of evidence—both 
statistical and anecdotal—of discrimination against patients based on their race, 
gender, disability and other characteristics. For example, physicians overestimate 
pain tolerance of patients of color, leading to systemic undertreatment.134 Female 
patients similarly have their symptoms downplayed by physicians, and patients 
belonging to more than one marginalized group experience compounding 
discrimination.135 Providers can be held liable for providing inferior treatment, 
 
130 THINKCULTURALHEALTH, National Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services 
Standards, HHS.GOV, https://thinkculturalhealth.hhs.gov/clas/standards (last visited Apr. 8, 2021). 
 
131 A physician who is also from an underrepresented community may be more attune to such 
issues. A nurse practitioner that who has one patient who is limited English proficient may be 
more likely to seek the appropriate services with similarly situated patients in the future. 
 
132See STATEMENT ON RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS, supra note 66, at 4. 
 
133 See id. at 4. 
 
134 See Hoffman et al., supra note 7, at 4296; see also P.R. Lockhart, What Serena Williams’s 
scary childbirth story says about medical treatment of black women, VOX (Jan. 11, 2018, 4:40 
PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/1/11/16879984/serena-williams-childbirth-scare-black-
women (reporting that black women are three to four times more likely to die from maternity 
complications). 
 
135 See Katie Klabusich, It’s Not All in Your Head: New Book Sheds Light on ‘Bad Medicine and 





misdiagnosing, or denying care to patients based on their protected 
characteristics—whether intentional or unintentional.136 The existence of tort 
liability for discriminatory treatment by providers raises the question: Is 
discrimination by healthcare AI a  cause of action for medical practice? 
Scholars and healthcare providers alike recognize that the use of AI in 
healthcare, particularly for clinical decision-making, does not amount to 
“substitution” of the provider’s role.137 Regardless of a physician’s reliance on AI, 
the responsibility of clinical decision-making lies with the physician: The AI does 
not practice medicine.138 
Physicians can be subject to tort liability when their diagnosis and treatment 
decisions fall below the standard of the customary practice.139 Where any new 
practices are used, it is naturally difficult for the physician to establish that she 
comported with “custom.”140 When AI is used and results in injury to a patient (e.g., 
from misdiagnosis), particularly injury arising from a bias, is the physician liable 
for the AI’s decision? To date, no court has applied the physician liability standard 
where AI was at issue.141 Similar to the challenges created by lack of regulation, 
lack of tort precedent around healthcare AI creates a compliance challenge for 
providers.  
Malpractice litigation around healthcare AI may center on the established 
safety and quality of the technology. Nicholas Terry points out that in many 
domains, automated technology is expected or even preferred (e.g., automation in 
 
that-harm-women/ (noting that women of color and low-income women face discrimination at 
high rates). 
 
136 See Can discrimination be a form of medical malpractice?, CRANWELL & MOORE P.L.C., 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.cranwellmoorelaw.com/blog/2018/04/can-
discrimination-be-a-form-of-medical-malpractice/ (explaining that preventable medical errors 
arising out of a physician’s prejudice are actionable). However, not all disparate treatments in the 
medical profession are discriminatory. See generally Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard, 
607 So.2d 517, 521 (La. 1992) (holding that a statutory cap on malpractice judgements, which 
essentially treats people with more costly injuries differently than those with less costly injuries, 
was not unconstitutional). 
 
137 See Terry, supra note 9, at 148. Although beyond the scope of this Article, Terry further notes 
that patients in underdeveloped nations may welcome AI as the primary provider—not as a 
substitute, but as “otherwise unobtainable healthcare.” 
 
138 See id. at 148. Babylon Health, for example, states on their “About” page: “Babylon’s AI 
services provide health information only, and do not provide diagnosis.”  BABYLON HEALTH, 
https://www.babylonhealth.com/ai (last visited Mar. 5, 2020). 
 
139 See Ben A. Rich, Medical Custom and Medical Ethics: Rethinking the Standard of Care, 14 
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 27, 28 (2005). 
 
140 See Zach Harned et al., Machine Vision, Medical AI, and Malpractice, HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
DIGEST 6 (2019), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/digestImages/PDFs/Harned19-03.pdf.  





commercial airlines).142 However, the FDA has issued guidance (read warnings) 
stating that the “safety and effectiveness” of certain robotic devices—such as 
robotically-assisted surgical devices in mastectomy and cancer treatments—has not 
been established.143 Where AI technology is untested (or has been shown to have 
negative biases), providers should avoid using them in their clinical decisions or 
consult with the relevant agencies for advisory opinions. Healthcare entities should 
engage in regular and thorough review to ensure the technology they opt for is not 
later revealed to have discriminatory effects.  
Moreover, physicians are still expected to have ultimate review of their AI’s 
clinical determinations. Regardless of advancements in AI, it is unlikely that courts 
will permit patients to bring malpractice lawsuits against the AI system. Therefore, 
malpractice litigation may apply scope-of-practice doctrines to AI, such as by 
allowing AI to make decisions under a physician’s “standing orders” (i.e., an 
algorithm).144 Another analysis courts might use is to treat physicians’ use of AI as 
legitimate consultation with an expert.145 For example, when AI is used to make a 
radiology decision under this approach, the physician must establish that the AI is 
properly “trained,” used a patient’s specific clinical history and findings to reach 
its decision, identified similar cases, and can “point” to the relevant parts of a 
patient’s scan.146  Ultimately, AI may advance to the point that using AI is 
customary practice and drawing analogies to expert-consultations is 
unnecessary.147 An additional compliance challenge may arise from the fact that 
there are multiple entities in the distribution chain of healthcare AI, including the 
manufacturer that creates it (products liability), to the hospitals and clinics that 
 
142 See Terry, supra note 9, at 174. 
 
143 Caution When Using Robotically-Assisted Surgical Devices in Women’s Health including 
Mastectomy and Other Cancer-Related Surgeries: FDA Safety Communication, U.S. FOOD & 
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145 See Harned et al., supra note 140, at 6–7. 
  
146 See id. at 7. 
 
147 This point raises an interesting question in terms of the future of malpractice liability: Will AI 
alter our interpretation of the duty of care that physicians owe their patients? Currently, the 
standard of care for malpractice liability relies on expert testimony of what other physicians would 
do in the same or similar circumstances—this question necessarily includes a physician’s ability to 
empathize with and appreciate a patient’s circumstances. See id. at 7. As physicians increasingly 
rely on AI decisions, this element of human empathy may gradually be removed from the standard 





adopt it (facilities and equipment), and to the physicians that use and review its 
decisions (malpractice).148 
Tort liability presents many risks for providers, so their compliance 
programs seek to mitigate such risks (e.g., through reporting mechanisms). Given 
the numerous open questions presented in this section, healthcare providers should, 
again, take a cautious approach. Since the law treats providers as having primacy, 
they should always thoroughly review all AI determinations—whether it is a new 
decision (e.g., an initial diagnosis, or new treatment plan) or a decision to make no 
change to the patient’s treatment, diagnosis, or prescription. Reviewing even these 
seemingly low-risk decisions is important from the provider’s perspective because 
even a decision to do nothing is still a decision for which the physician can be liable. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Thus far, this Article has discussed what is lacking in terms of 
antidiscrimination in healthcare AI. The FDA’s enforcement is only emerging and 
does not fully capture the potential for discriminatory effects by AI. Section 1557, 
while binding on covered entities, has taken a backseat to OCR’s other enforcement 
efforts, and private rights of action are largely unavailable to patients seeking 
disparate-impact liability. Additionally, OCR has been silent on the applicability of 
Section 1557 on the use of AI tools. And state licensing boards lack the statutory 
hook to govern the way healthcare providers rely on AI. A new approach is 
necessary to ensure that nondiscrimination is a valued legal principle in healthcare 
AI, two questions remain: What is the right approach? And who will enforce it? 
A. Industry Standards and Internal Compliance 
It would be wise to require nondiscrimination at the start—at AI 
development. One method would be for the AI industry to adopt its own standards 
that reflect nondiscrimination. In the absence of legal obligations, some scholars 
suggest private companies adopt internal standards to reflect an ethical approach to 
creating AI.149 This can take the form of internal standards (e.g., Facebook, IBM, 
Microsoft) or standards set forth by professional associations (e.g., Association for 
the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Association of Computing Machinery, 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers).150 Some organizations, like the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ 2016 report, “Ethically Aligned 
Design,” emphasized “human norms and values” and “value sensitive or value-
 
148 Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 389 P.3d 517 (Wash. 2017) (addressing the question of which 
members of the distribution chain are subject to liability and holding that product liability under 
the Washington Consumer Protection Act requires the device manufacturer to provide product 
warnings to the hospital and the physician). 
 
149 See Katyal, supra note 22, at 108–09. 
 





based design.”151 The British Computer Society’s code of conduct requires 
individuals must “promote equal access to the benefit of IT and promote the 
inclusion of all sectors of society whenever opportunities raise.”152 These principles 
can (and should) be adopted by trade organizations of AI developers and should be 
incorporated into the codes of conduct, policies and procedures, and human impact 
statements of individual AI companies.  
Google, for example, lists its principles and objectives for its AI products 
publicly. One such objective is to “avoid creating or reinforcing unfair bias.”153 
AI algorithms and datasets can reflect, reinforce, or reduce unfair 
biases.  We recognize that distinguishing fair from unfair biases is 
not always simple and differs across cultures and societies. We will 
seek to avoid unjust impacts on people, particularly those related to 
sensitive characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender, nationality, 
income, sexual orientation, ability, and political or religious 
belief.154 
IBM similarly includes “fairness” as an element in its “Five Areas of Ethical 
Focus.” 
AI provides deeper insight into our personal lives when interacting 
with our sensitive data. As humans are inherently vulnerable to 
biases, and are responsible for building AI, there are chances for 
human bias to be embedded in the systems we create. It is the role 
of a responsible team to minimize algorithmic bias through ongoing 
research and data collection which is representative of a diverse 
population.155 
Since not all bias can be eliminated from AI decision-making (despite the 
data-vetting methods discussed in Part III(A)), healthcare entities must consider 
methods to counterbalance bias in their compliance programs. Under industry 
standards, manufacturer’s may already be expected to engage in independent 
 
151 INSTITUTE FOR ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS (IEEE), ETHICALLY ALIGNED 
DESIGN 29, 39 (2016),  http://standards.ieee.org/develop/indconn/ec/ead_v1.pdf 
 
152 BCS Code of Conduct, BRITISH COMPUT. SOC’Y, https://www.bcs.org/category/6030 (last 
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155 IBM, EVERYDAY ETHICS FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 32, 38–39 (2019), 
https://www.ibm.com/watson/assets/duo/pdf/everydayethics.pdf. IBM further makes several 
recommendations: (1) investigating and understanding intentional and unintentional biases; (2) 
design and develop without intentional biases and schedule team reviews for unintentional biases, 
including stereotyping, confirmation biases, and “sunk cost” bias; and (3) include a “feedback 





review of their products for validity and quality;156 such standards can be expanded 
to require independent review for biases. Key to achieving the nondiscrimination 
principles discussed here will be transparency—entities should develop their own 
factors for ensuring that information about their AI technology is readily available 
to patients, providers, and regulators. This information may include (1) a 
description of the AI’s design and testing, (2) the elements on which the AI makes 
predictions, the weights assigned to those elements, and (3) the source of the 
training dataset and the “outcome data” used to validate the AI.157 This level of 
transparency will not only assist regulators to better understand the landscape of 
healthcare AI and develop future regulations, but it also provides patients with a 
meaningful opportunity to challenge the use of AI if they experience harmful 
effects. 
While the opportunity to challenge is highly recommended as a counter-
balance method to AI bias in other industries (e.g., criminal justice),158 the 
opportunity to file for a hearing will not help a patient who has been incorrectly 
diagnosed by a physician or whose coverage has been denied by an insurer.159 
Patients (and their lawyers) are not versed in medicine, they do not possess the 
necessary expertise to dispute the correctness of medical diagnosis or 
appropriateness of a treatment plan, particularly to effectively argue that AI bias 
played a role in those decisions. Healthcare entities should consider methods to 
make the AI open to a meaningful challenge, such as implementing a panel where 
a harmed patient and her counsel can access professional medical opinions to build 
their case.160 Additionally, covered entities should consider other methods to 
counterbalance the effects of bias in healthcare AI when it is used—such as a 
rebuttable presumption against the AI decision or de novo review of its decisions 
when a patient challenges an AI determination. 
 
156 SAMD GUIDANCE, supra note 44, at 16. These SaMD guidelines were created by IMDFR, then 
adopted by FDA. 
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159 Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2144–45 
(2017). Even the “open to challenge” option can be problematic: A study of ICE found that the 
agency overrode its algorithm-based risk-assessment tool’s recommendations in 19% of cases 
where LGBT people were involved. In developing compliance programs, covered entities should 
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B. Recommended Regulations and a “Super Regulation” 
Some argue that regulators, not private companies, should take the lead in 
developing policies around AI-informed tools.161 The findings in the UnitedHealth 
case study should indicate to the AI industry that companies need to be robust in 
their nondiscrimination assessments—merely cutting out factors such as race or 
disability is insufficient to eliminate disparate-impact to those characteristics.162 
Professor Sean K. Hallisey suggests an “AI Data Transparency Model” that shifts 
the focus from regulating the AI algorithms and developers towards regulating the 
data itself through auditing and certification requirements.163 The FDA can adopt 
guidelines (or add guidelines to its proposed frameworks) that reflect 
nondiscrimination standards in the SaMD and CDS which it approves. However, 
the descriptor “medical device”—the hook for FDA regulation—fails to fully 
capture the cognitive-like characterization of AI.164 As discussed earlier, the FDA’s 
limited authority would still leave healthcare AI that is used for billing or other 
administrative purposes unregulated.  
Another approach is to regulate the usage of AI, as opposed to its creation. 
There are some bases to find that state licensing boards have authority to regulate 
healthcare AI: (1) future AI, particularly diagnostic and procedural ones, may 
actually be able to practice medicine and (2) other doctrines permit licensure 
regulations, particularly the corporate practice of medicine and scope of practice 
(SOP).165 SOP guidelines for nurse practitioners who, depending on jurisdiction, 
can diagnose and treat with or without physician involvement can be used as a 
model for SOP around healthcare AI.166 The application of SOP doctrine leads to 
 
161 Hayley Tsukayama & Jamie Williams, If A Pre-Trial Risk Assessment Tool Does Not Satisfy 
These Criteria, It Needs to Stay Out of the Courtroom, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/11/if-pre-trial-risk-assessment-tool-does-not-satisfy-these-
criteria-it-needs-stay. While Tsukayama and Williams’s argument was in the context of the 
criminal justice system, the principles they discuss may translate to the healthcare industry. 
 
162 See id. Removing just the suspect factors (e.g., race, gender) will not remedy the inherent 
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of black people affected by racial bias in health-care algorithms, NATURE (Oct. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03228-6#ref-CR1. The problem is further 
exacerbated by the lack of diversity among software developers because they are less likely to 
anticipate potential biases or consider including certain mitigating data-elements. 
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Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428, 434 (2019). 
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an interesting questions: If an AI is “licensable” to what extent can it practice and 
be developed for one purpose and be tasked for another? 
Finally, some scholars suggest an entirely new regulatory regime—perhaps 
even the creation of a new agency—to oversee development of all AI technology 
(not just healthcare) through a “super regulator” or a third-party auditing 
mechanism.167 “There are ways to minimize bias and unfairness in pretrial risk 
assessment, but it requires proper guidance and oversight.”168 California Senate Bill 
10 is an example of an effort to regulate AI that fell short. The Bill sought to 
implement AI for pretrial sentencing determinations, but it lacked governance 
about proper oversight, calculating risk levels, or methods to protect against biased 
outcomes.169   
A super-regulation may resolve some of these concerns by governing AI 
technology from its initial inception in the IRB review process (e.g., ensuring the 
training data is unbiased), through FDA clearance (e.g., testing to ensure quality 
and nondiscriminatory effects), all the way up to implementation and use by 
healthcare entities (e.g., appropriate review by providers and compliance with 
Section 1557). Nicholas Terry proposes three characteristics of a regulatory matrix 
for AI: Unitary, holistic, and universal.170 These characteristics applied to the 
nondiscrimination principles addressed here can create an entirely new regulatory 
regime for healthcare AI: 
● Unitary. Rather than separating AI device and practice of medicine using 
AI, a regulatory framework can address both in tandem;  
● Holistic. A regulatory framework for AI can address the nondiscrimination 
concerns discussed here, as well as other criticisms (e.g., quality and safety, 
transparency, data protection, and cost effectiveness);  
● Universal. A universal approach will ensure that clinical and administrative 
uses of AI are not treated differently, and that different healthcare entities 
(e.g., hospitals and insurers) are not treated differently. Relatedly, the super-
regulation would apply to all healthcare entities regardless of whether they 
receive federal funds. Given the growing use of AI and potential for data-
sharing, a universal regulation could also protect nondiscrimination if the 
data contained in AI leaves the  healthcare domain. 
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“Against this historical backdrop [of racial imbalance], it is imperative that 
pretrial risk assessment instruments, if used at all, be designed to help meet the 
goal of reducing racial disparities . . . . If a tool cannot help achieve that goal, 
then it is not a tool that the justice system needs.”171 
 
The quote above is from a statement released by over 100 advocacy 
organizations in response to California Senate Bill 10, a legislation that essentially 
approved the use of AI in the criminal justice context.172 As emphasized throughout 
this Article, AI-informed decision-making is emerging in nearly every industry. 
From determinations made by the government (e.g., public benefits) to those made 
by private actors (e.g., employers), researchers and advocates are concerned about 
the discriminatory effects inherent in AI. AI used in the healthcare context, 
however, presents a unique challenge: these biases can permeate the intimate nature 
of the examination room or operating room. 
 This Article discussed the effects of AI bias from a legal and compliance 
standpoint. The existing nondiscrimination responsibilities on healthcare entities 
through Section 1557 of the ACA are likely to extend to healthcare AI. Similarly, 
licensing requirements and the threat of malpractice liability will continue to hold 
physicians to a standard of care when using AI, one that does not condone 
discrimination.  However, those responsibilities do not govern the design and 
development of AI—where bias is most likely to be imbedded. As discussed in this 
Article, the FDA’s enforcement authority is currently too limited to adequately 
oversee all types of healthcare AI and is unlikely to address discrimination.   
The promise of AI is attractive: Faster, less costly, and more accurate 
decision-making. Advocates of healthcare AI technology argue that it has the 
potential to reduce errors resulting from human variation by physicians.173  In fact, 
these advocates argue that AI has the potential to eliminate, rather than introduce 
or perpetuate, biases in healthcare because it can be programmed to not be 
influenced by external information about patients or their finances.174 AI even 
presents a novel opportunity to remedy many health disparities. For example, AI 
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could be used as a tool in psychiatry to diagnose or treat individuals with severe 
mental illness.175 
 But the “promise” of AI is misleading. Without a comprehensive 
(legislative, regulatory, or industry standard) framework that addresses biases in 
AI, patients that have historically not benefited from the healthcare industry will 
continue to face discrimination—engrained systemic biases, will only become 
solidified, automated ones. Patients belonging to suspect classes or low-socio-
economic communities have historically been excluded from the benefits of the 
American healthcare system,176 and patients have little reason to trust to 
automation.177 As AI explodes as a clinical and administrative tool, 
nondiscrimination principles should be at the center of regulators’ and the 
industries’ plans. 
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